Private Religious Displays in Public Areas
Officials encounter a different set of constitutional
issues when the government creates a public
forum, such as a public square open to all, where
private parties can present their own views.
Federal courts have ruled that government may
not discriminate in granting access to these public
spaces. As a result, government may not be able to
block displays that some find offensive, such as a
cross erected by the Ku Klux Klan.
In one such case, Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette (1995), the Supreme Court addressed the
rights of private speakers to place religious displays
in a state-created forum. In this case, the
court ruled that Ohio officials were wrong to
deny the Ku Klux Klan the right to place a
large cross on Capitol Square, a 10-acre state-owned
plaza surrounding the Ohio Statehouse
in Columbus.
Capitol Square Review Board
v. Pinette (1995)
| Majority: | Minority: |
| Breyer | Ginsburg |
| Kennedy | Stevens |
| O’Connor | |
| Scalia | |
| Souter | |
| Rehnquist | |
| Thomas | |
Writing for a plurality of the court, Justice Scalia
(joined by Justices Thomas, Kennedy and
Rehnquist) argued that by excluding the cross,
officials had violated the Ku Klux Klan’s rights of
free expression. Scalia concluded that such a display
represented private speech in a public forum,
and in such a forum, the speech can never reasonably
be attributed to the state. Therefore, he wrote,
the government could not cite a violation of the
Establishment Clause as a reason to exclude the
display from a public forum. In a concurring
opinion, Justice O’Connor (joined by Justices
Souter and Breyer) agreed that in this case the Ku
Klux Klan’s rights to free speech had been violated
but disagreed on the question of whether private
religious speech could ever be reasonably
attributed to the government.
The disagreement in Pinette is reflected in a number
of lower court cases. When government opens
public space for the expression of competing
views, the courts have ruled, it may not exclude
religious views or discriminate in favor of or
against certain faiths. If the space is open for private
displays, then all parties are entitled to the
same access. The rules of the forum must be the
same for both religious and nonreligious displays.
This principle of equal access has come into play
in cases involving holiday displays. For example, in
Chabad of Southern Ohio & Congregation Lubavitch
v. City of Cincinnati (2004), the 6th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the city of Cincinnati
could not exclude a religious group from placing a
Hanukkah menorah on the city’s main public
square, an area that the court determined to be a
public forum for private expression. The court
thus concluded that the city had unconstitutionally
attempted to exclude controversial displays,
including those with religious content that might
offend local citizens. The right of equal access to a
public forum did not permit such an exclusion,
the court ruled.
More recently, the widows of two American combat
veterans brought suit against U.S. government officials
for refusing to permit a Wiccan symbol (a fivepointed
star surrounded by a circle) on headstones
in military cemeteries. The government has a list of
approved headstone emblems, which includes nearly
40 symbols of religious faith, but the list did not
include the Wiccan symbol. In a lawsuit filed in a U.S.
district court in Wisconsin, Circle Sanctuary v. Nicholson,
the widows argued that in this type of public
space, the government may not favor some religious
faiths over others. In April 2007, the U.S. Department
of Veteran Affairs settled the suit by agreeing
to allow the Wiccan symbol on grave markers.
If local governments do not want to be held
responsible for the content of private displays on
public property, they may forbid all such displays,
whether religious or secular. For instance, in Wells
v. City & County of Denver (2001), the 10th Circuit
upheld the city of Denver’s decision to ban all
unattended displays at the entrance to the City and
County Building. The ban did not apply to displays
attended around the clock by their sponsors. The
court found the distinction to be reasonable. With
an attended display, the court concluded, there was
no risk that the display’s message would be attributed
to the city, and a prohibition of all unattended
displays – religious and nonreligious alike – was a
reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation.
Photo credit: Corbis